


- 1. CPU privilege levels
- 2. Memory protection, the problem
- 3. Protection schemes
 - (A) Segmentaion (x86)
 - (B) PMP (RISC-V)
 - (C) Paging (brief)
- 4. Meltdown & its consequences
- 5. Other possible solutions

RISC-V:

high $\xrightarrow{M/S/U}$ low
 low \rightarrow high = { interrupt
 exception
 ecall
 high \rightarrow low : mret
 + mstatus.MPP



Q: motivation: why do people want privilege levels?

- security
- fault isolation
- resource multiplexing
- provide abstraction

Q: running the same piece of code in unprivileged and privileged mode, what will be the difference?

- CSRs (registers)
- certain memory regions
- instructions

Program
 - Code (instructions)
 - registers
 - memory
 Intvec (CSR)

Mechanism: exceptions





Q: How could I know what privilege level the current CPU is running in?

""



RISC-V deliberately doesn't make it easy for code to discover what mode it is running in because this is a virtualisation hole. As a general principle, code should be designed for and implicitly know what mode it will run in. Applications code should assume it is in U mode. The operating system should assume it is in S mode (it might in fact be virtualised and running in U mode, with things U mode can't do trapped and emulated by the hypervisor).

[from <https://forums.sifive.com/t/how-to-determine-the-current-execution-privilege-mode/2823>]




2. Memory protection, the problem

Q: Motivation? why do we need memory protection?



access control:



invalid ops:


1. invalid instr
2. invalid op
3. invalid mem

Multiple questions:

- Q1: what are memory objs? (memory granularity)
- Q2: who is the subj? (how to define subj)
- Q3: where to store the ACL?

(A) segmentation (from x86)

- 8086 (1978).



- 80286 (1982) ← memory protection

- 80386 (1985)

x86-32 →





Figure 3-2. Flat Model

Local Descriptor Table (LDT)

	base	limit	access
5			
4	0x21430	0xC000	v/w/x
3			
2	0x0CEF0	0xA300	
1	0x28C00	0xFC00	
0			

Linear base address (BASE) Segment size (LIMIT)



Q1: what are memory objs? (memory granularity)

segment (base, base+limit)

Q2: who is the subj? (how to define subj)

instructions + descriptors
+ priv level

Q3: where to store the ACL?

access bits in descriptors

Name	Description	Base	Limit	DPL
__KERNEL_CS	Kernel code segment	0	4 GiB	0
__KERNEL_DS	Kernel data segment	0	4 GiB	0
__USER_CS	User code segment	0	4 GiB	3
__USER_DS	User data segment	0	4 GiB	3

$2^{32} = 4\text{GiB}$

high

low

ring




Figure 3-1. Segmentation and Paging

(B) PMP (from RISC-V)

Cheng Tan, OSI

OSI Week06a

Physical Memory Protection (PMP)

(a) pmpaddr[0-63]




Figure 3.33: PMP address register format, RV32.

(b) pmpcfg[0-15]




Figure 3.31: RV32 PMP configuration CSR layout.

(c) pmp[0-63]cfg




Figure 3.35: PMP configuration register format.

(d) pmp[0-63]cfg.A

A	Name	Description
0	OFF	Null region (disabled)
1	TOR	Top of range
2	NA4	Naturally aligned four-byte region
3	NAPOT	Naturally aligned power-of-two region, ≥8 bytes

Table 3.10: Encoding of A field in PMP configuration registers.

Q1: what are memory objs? (memory granularity)


$pmpaddr + pmpcfg.A$


Q2: who is the subj? (how to define subj)

instructions + prv. W.


Q3: where to store the ACL?

pmpcfg





(C) paging (brief)



Q1: what are memory objs? (memory granularity)

page (4kB)

Q2: who is the subj? (how to define subj)

instruct + page table (root: satp)

CR3 (x86)


Q3: where to store the ACL?


page table entry

CSR

4. Meltdown & its consequences

before 2018:





Q: What are the fundamental approaches to provide isolation?

